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Abstract
According to scholarly wisdom, party competition at the subnational level plays a
negligible role in national elections. We provide theory and evidence that qualifies
this view. Subnational elections determine entrance into subnational parliaments,
which provides essential organizational resources: members and money. Since in
most cases the same political actors compete at all levels of government, they can
make use of these resources to improve their status in national party competi-
tion. We test our argument exploiting two institutional features of the German
multi-level electoral context: the discontinuities generated by the five percent
electoral threshold in German state elections, and the occurance of German state
elections at different times in the federal election cycle. We find that parties
that marginally cross the threshold for state parliamentary representation gain
more members, and eventually perform better in national elections, but only if
the party has sufficient time to organize between the state and the federal elec-
tion. Consistent with our organizational explanation, bottom-up effects are more
pronounced where state parliamentary parties receive more financial resources.
Alternative mechanisms are tested, and receive no empirical support.
∗We would like to thank Alex Coppock, Andy Eggers, Bob Erikson, Edward Fieldhouse, Shigeo
Hirano, Camille Strauss-Kahn, Catherine de Vries, two anonymous reviewers and the QJPS editors for
their thoughtful comments and suggestions. As a result this paper has been much improved. Moreover
we are grateful to Diana Galos and Giordano Neuenschwander for excellent research assistance, and to
Heike Merten for background information relating to the development of party financing in Germany.
Over the last decades many countries have delegated previously centrally coordinated
competencies to their subnational authorities (Benz 2009; Deschouwer 2003; Rodden
2004). This decentralization process has been accompanied by the formation and
strengthening of subnational representative institutions, as well as the growing number
and importance of subnational elections fostering party competition at the subnational
level (Deschouwer 2003; Detterbeck 2012; Schakel 2013). An important question that
arises from this development is whether representation in this lower tier of politics has
had any noteworthy effect on national electoral results.
The bulk of the existing literature suggests that this should not be the case. Most
studies point to top-down electoral dynamics, whereby subnational politics are mainly
reflections of the national electoral momentum and the national election cycle (Camp-
bell 1991; Dinkel 1977; Gabriel 1989; Hainmueller and Kern 2005; Jeffrey and Hough
2002; Jérôme and Lewis-Beck 1999; Lohmann, Brady and Rivers 1997). Subnational
elections are characterized as second-order elections (Marsh 1998; Reif and Schmitt
1980, 9), used by voters as mid-term elections, either to punish incumbent parties
(McLean, Heath and Taylor 1996; Pallarés and Keating 2003; Tronconi and Roux
2009) or to accommodate their policy demands through electoral balancing (Erikson
and Mikhail 2001; Lutz Kern and Hainmueller 2006; Rodden and Wibbels 2010).
The same conclusion is also reached by a different strand of research, pointing
to the nationalization of party organization and election campaigns. According to
the cartel party thesis (Katz and Mair 1995; 1997; 2009), party competition becomes
dominated by the national level at the expense of the local party organization. For the
mass party, members were deemed vital for parties’ survival. In an electoral context,
however, that promotes centrally-orchestrated campaigns in which the party’s message
is quickly and effectively disseminated to the electorate through the use of the mass
media, the question whether a party engages the party membership is said to be less
vital to party competition (King 2002; Mughan 1995).
Drawing on Panebianco’s theory of party institutionalization (1988), we develop a
theoretical account that challenges this view. Although our departure point builds on
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the “cartel party thesis” (Katz and Mair 1995), we depart from Katz and Mair (1995)
to accommodate multi-level systems of government. The mechanism driving the cartel
party thesis is that parties that are part of the political system —so-called “insiders”—
gain an electoral edge over their competitors by taking advantage of state resources
(Katz and Mair 1994; 1995; 1997). Resources are deemed vital for institutionalization,
the process by which political parties ensure their long-term survival (Panebianco 1988).
We extend this logic of institutionalization into multi-level government. Outcomes of
subnational elections influence national electoral dynamics because they determine
whether parties enhance their organizational capacity by gaining access to financial
and human resources at lower levels of government. Since the same political parties
tend to compete at all levels of government, they can use the money and members
gained from entering subnational parliament to improve their standing in a national
election.
A empirical test of this idea involves a comparison between parliamentary “insiders”
and “outsiders,” i.e. parties that do not usually enter parliament. The problem, how-
ever, is that these two groups of parties differ on many accounts apart from whether
they have access into the resources provided by subnational representative institutions.
Since entrance into parliament is not randomly assigned, it is difficult to disentangle
the effect of subnational parliamentary representation on national electoral performance
from all other potentially confounding differences between the two groups.
We address this problem by carefully selecting our case of study. In particular, we
focus on the German federal system. In German state elections (“Landtagswahlen”) en-
trance into the state parliament is determined by the presence of an electoral threshold.
Parties need to receive at least 5% of the vote in order to gain access to the state leg-
islature. Parties that receive less than 5% of the vote stay out. We thus construct our
comparison groups by using the discontinuities generated by this five percent threshold
that applies to all state elections in Germany.1
1 The same threshold applies in federal elections (“Bundestagswahlen”), but we do not
use it here, because parties’ federal level vote share is only used as the main outcome
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Even if this design permits the identification of the effect of parliamentary represen-
tation on national electoral performance, it still leaves open one important alternative
explanation. Entering state parliament might help parties’ future electoral performance
not through the provision of material resources but simply because it operates as a sig-
nal of electoral viability. In so doing, it may yield spillover effects. Electoral success
in one arena might lead to more success in another arena because voters want to be
on the winning side or because there is a feeling of ‘’momentum” (Bartels 1985; Goidel
and Shields 1994; Simon 1954).
The German electoral setting is particularly helpful in also addressing this com-
peting explanation. German state elections occur at different times during the federal
election cycle. While the spillover mechanism should be more pronounced if elections
follow in quick succession, the organizational benefits stemming from entering subna-
tional parliaments should not materialize immediately. Indeed, organizational effects
stemming from institutionalization should be the larger, the more time parties have
to put these resources to use. The two mechanisms can thus be observationally dis-
tinguished by considering the variation in the time elapsed between subnational and
national elections. We unpack the mechanism further by examining two observational
implications of our organizational theory. First, we show that the electoral effects of
entering state parliament are the larger, the larger the available state funding for par-
liamentary parties in a given state. Second, we further trace the organizational roots
of these effects by testing whether subnational representation affects the number of
party members in a given state, which we argue is a good measure of organizational
capability.
In what follows we first develop the organizational hypothesis and derive expecta-
tions about the effect of subnational parliamentary representation on national electoral
performance. We then describe the research design and present the results. We discuss
the implications from our findings in the concluding section.
of interest.
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The Organizational Returns to Subnational Parliamentary Rep-
resentation: Money and Members
In a recent study, Bechtel (2012) argues that there are important bottom-up effects
from subnational politics to national politics that have previously been ignored. As
he acknowledges, “we know virtually nothing about whether and how subnational elec-
tions influence vote intentions at the national-level” (Bechtel 2012, 3). We posit that
one of the ways in which subnational elections affect national electoral outcomes is by
determining which parties gain access to subnational representative institutions. The
logic is exemplified in Panebianco’s following remark about the way in which different
electoral contests are interlinked (Panebianco 1988, 9):
Party arenas are interdependent and can be conceived as a network of “rel-
evant” environments. Resources obtained in one arena can be spent in an-
other, and success at one gambling table —the exchange of resources under
favorable conditions— often affects the extent of one’s success at other ta-
bles.
Multi-level systems of government provide multiple points of access to two types of
organizational resources 2 that are key to a party’s electoral success: money and party
members. In decentralized systems, a larger share of these resources is available at the
subnational level of government, and varies conditional on entrance into state parlia-
ment: state parliaments provide parties with money to pay for the professionalization
of their staff and political activities, which in turn increases the attractiveness of the
party to potential activists and supporters. Money and members enable parties to
2 The assumption that holding elected office comes with resources that are electorally
meaningful is mirrored in the literature on US Congressional elections, which shows
that direct office holder benefits contribute to explaining the incumbency advantage
(Levitt and Wolfram 1997; Serra 1994).
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better weather political eventualities and national electoral dynamics. Let us explore
these two types of benefits in more detail.
The first organizational resource available to state parliamentary parties is money.
State parliaments provide generous budgets to parliamentary parties for their organi-
zation and day-to-day business. Parties use this money to pay their party leadership,
state representatives, parliamentary researchers, special advisors, and constituency case
workers (Katz and Mair 2009). Germany represents a typical case of this practice. Data
that we collected from the federal budget and the 16 state budgets show that in 2010
parliamentary parties received a total of around 186 million euros for the upkeep of
their parliamentary work, of which around 108 million euros were paid to state par-
liamentary parties (see Table A.7 in the Appendix for a break-down by state). This
compares to a total of 132 million euros at all levels of government that was available
through the direct public party financing mechanism, which does not discriminate be-
tween parliamentary insiders and outsiders (Bundestag 2011). It is no wonder then
that Katz and Mair (Katz and Mair 2009) increasingly see the roots of cartelization
in the parliamentary party. Funding provided to parliamentary parties in the Ger-
man system constitutes a form of indirect, opaque party financing, which is arguably
more important than official public subsidies. There is much evidence that parties
use funds available to parliamentary parties to support the work of the party on the
ground (Pulzer 2001; Scarrow 2006b). As Pulzer (2001, 31) writes, “while direct use
of their funds for party purposes is illegal, the line between legislative work, academic
research, and campaigning is difficult to draw”. Moreover, parliamentary parties use
part of these funds to raise the salaries of some parliamentarians, chiefly benefitting
their leadership, and most oblige office holders to contribute parts of their salary to
party work (Scarrow 2006b). State funds are also used to equip parliamentary and
constituency offices, from where state representatives provide a range of services to
constituents. Importantly, all these financial resources stay in the state and support
the state party’s political operation. If a party loses parliamentary representation in
a given state, the money stops flowing and all employees of the state parliamentary
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party will be made redundant, meaning the party will not only lose all its members of
parliament, but also twice as many professional staff, which vastly outnumber staff in
central party offices.
Second, entrance into legislatures improves party organization by increasing incen-
tives for state party membership and grassroots activism (Panebianco 1988). There
are at least three types of motivations for joining a party in the parliament. First,
winning or losing a seat affects personal efficacy, the prospects of a political career.
Whiteley and Seyd (1998), and Fisher and colleagues (2006) find that personal efficacy
is a key element explaining why winning a constituency election contest boosts party
membership and activism in UK parliamentary seats. Political careers normally begin
at the subnational level, especially in the context of multilevel government (Katz and
Mair 2009). Second, presence in parliament increases group efficacy, the prospects of
influencing policy (Fisher, Denver and Hands 2006). Seyd and Whiteley (1992) and
Whiteley, Seyd and Richardson (1994) provide survey evidence that many activists join
a party because they feel they can affect policy —a perception that is greatly enhanced
once a party enters parliament. If subnational levels of government provide avenues
for affecting policy, the same mechanism should hold in multi-level systems. Third, it
is also possible that parties reward their members through patronage appointments in
ministries, or the public sector more widely (John and Poguntke 2012; Poguntke 1994;
Smith 1979). Although parties present in government probably have a larger influence
over patronage appointments, in a consensus democracy such as Germany, at least
some appointments are thought to be the outcome of negotiations between government
and opposition (Smith 1979).3
3 To be sure, partisan appointments might not always reflect clientelistic practices,
but the attempt to control decision making. Indicatively, Kopecký, Mair and Spirova
(2012) present evidence that patronage within the civil service in advanced democ-
racies is increasingly used to promote civil servants with the right party affiliation to
exercise control over policy making, and less to reward faithful party members with
jobs in the regional administration. Irrespective of the exact motives driving such
appointments, the fact that they are decided on partisan grounds is likely to increase
supply of membership.
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Increased grassroots membership benefits parties in a multitude of ways. Although
in the short run new parties might be able to attract activists without institutionalized
structures of support on grounds of shared ideology and collective interests alone, in
the long run institutionalization and the ability to affect policy and provide a political
career are crucial to the survival and success of the party (Panebianco 1988, 166). In
multilevel systems, state party members who joined as a result of a successful subna-
tional election will of course be available to campaign for the party in higher-order,
national election contests. Party members and supporters have a positive impact on
voter mobilization and persuasion (Cox 2010; Seyd and Whiteley 1992; Whiteley, Seyd
and Richardson 1994). They are ready to distribute leaflets, put out electoral advertis-
ing and knock on doors. Moreover, party members will spread the party’s message in
their households, neighborhoods and work places. As Aldrich (1995) has shown at the
example of the United States at the beginning of the 19th century, state party organi-
zation is key to electoral success at the national level. By entering state parliament, a
political party passes an important “organizational threshold” (Panebianco 1988, 193)
that helps foster further institutionalization.
A key characteristic of organizational resources is that positive electoral externali-
ties are not felt immediately, but need some time to materialize. Electoral support is
expected to rise as the number of voters who benefit from services provided to con-
stituents increases over time. Improvements in the quality of candidates recruited by
the state party will need some time to capture media attention. An extended member-
ship base is more likely to affect election results after the party organizes its grassroots
support and new members gain campaign experience. Dissemination of party messages
also needs time to reach a wider spectrum of constituents. Thus, there are often im-
portant long-term effects to improved party organization (Fisher, Denver and Hands
2006).
It is important to note that our line of thinking is driven by general and widely ap-
plicable benefits accompanying entrance into subnational legislatures. Our argument
does not depend on the direct public subsidies provided to political parties in some
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countries. In other words, the benefits discussed here are not contingent upon direct
public party financing. They exist even in the absence of direct subsidies to political
parties because parliamentary parties have found ways to allocate funds to themselves
that are not as easily scrutinized under party financing rules. Although the empirical
evidence about the electoral impact of public party financing rules is still ambiguous,4
the simultaneous presence of public party financing might conflate the observed effects
attributed to parliamentary representation. As is explained below, the choice of Ger-
many addresses this concern as official public party financing rules in Germany do not
discriminate between parliamentary insiders and outsiders.
An Alternative Explanation: Spillover Effects
Focusing on the importance of regional elections, Bechtel (2012) alludes to their role
as information cues transmitted by the national media about state party performance,
candidates and electoral success. The bandwagon effects literature on US Presidential
primaries goes one step further suggesting that electoral success or failure in one state’s
primary election produces spillover effects if there is another primary following in quick
succession (Bartels 1985; Simon 1954). It has been argued that electoral success leads to
more success because people want to be on the winning side (Goidel and Shields 1994).
This mechanism has also been associated with increasing media reports and the way
individuals recall the information, on which they base their voting decisions (Iyengar
1990; Mutz 1995). Individuals are more likely to recall information to which they
have been exposed more recently (Zaller 1992). Extending this line of argument, one
could argue that with the exception of major parties, entering into the state parliament
might signal success with possibly important side-effects for parties’ future electoral
4 While Katz and Mair (1994) originally located the roots of cartelization in the intro-
duction of direct public financing, in recent years they have raised doubts about its
impact on cartelization (2009; see also Pierre, Svasand and Widfeldt (2000); Scarrow
(2006a)).
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performance.5
Despite leading to equifinal expectations, the spillover mechanism differs from the
organizational hypothesis in one important respect: time. While electoral bandwagon
effects can explain electoral momentum from one election to the next if the two elections
follow in quick succession, they do not account for the financial and organizational
advantages provided to parties that perform well in state elections and manage to
enter parliament. The media hype often only lasts a couple of weeks and an electoral
bounce after a successful performance is likely to fade away.6 But substantial benefits
of representation, be it service provision in the constituency or organizational and
institutional privileges, are there to stay. More importantly, in contrast to spillover
effects, they are more likely to yield fruits only after some period has passed since the
party entered parliament. In what follows, we provide several tests to assess each of
the two mechanisms.
Data and Research Design
To test the effect of state parliamentary representation on federal party success in
Germany, we created our own data set, which includes the electoral results of all parties
that participated in German state and federal elections from 1946 up to 2013. The
data set is based on the official state and federal election results published by the
federal election commission (Bundeswahlleiter 2015a,b). For the period from 1946 up
to 1990 it includes the complete results for the 10 states that made up the former
5 An important critical view to the electoral importance of the spillover mechanism is
Mutz (1995). While Mutz agrees that increased media attention leads to an incentive
to consider the respective party, she cautions that this need not necessarily lead to
a voting decision in favor of the party. People “reassess their own views in light of
this new information. From this perspective, momentum appears far less pernicious
than typical references to bandwagon phenomena would suggest” (Mutz 1995, 120).
6 A nice illustration of how spillover effects operate is provided by the German Pirate
Party, which after entering the state parliament of Berlin in late 2011, attracted much
media attention, skyrocketed in national polls and entered 2 further state parliaments
in quick succession scoring 7.4 and 8.4 percent of the vote. However, one year and a
half after the party’s initial success, it fell back to around 3 percent in national polls
and ended up with a poor 2.2% in the 2013 federal election.
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Federal Republic before reunification. For the period between 1990 and 2013 the data
set includes all electoral results for the 10 old states and the 6 new states (including
the city state of Berlin).
Federal elections are held every 4 years and state elections every 4 to 5 years.
Each of the old states hence contributes 15-20 state election results and 18 federal
election results, while the new states contribute data on 5-6 state elections and 7
federal elections. The resulting dataset gives us 67 unique small parties that have
received between 0% and 10% of the vote in German state elections and participated
in subsequent federal elections. Moreover, it includes 30 distinct parties that achieved
between 1% and 9% of the vote and 10 parties that are located in the immediate
neighborhood (4.2% to 5.6%) of the 5% threshold. The four parties that contribute
most observations are the FDP, the Greens, the NPD, and the Republikaner (see Table
A.10 in the Appendix for a complete list of all parties included in the dataset, and for
the list of parties included at different bandwidths). Figure A.9 in the Appendix shows
the distribution of cases over time from 1946 to 2013. It is clear that most cases are
from the 1990s, 2000s and 2010s when Germany transformed from a two-and-a-half
party system into a fully-fledged multi-party system.
Since parliamentary insiders differ from outsiders in various unsobservable ways, we
make use of the discontinuities generated by the electoral rules used in German state
elections. German parties can only enter the state parliament if they have gathered
more than five percent of the total state vote. We use the presence of this electoral
threshold, which applies to all states for the whole period under investigation, as a
way to identify the effect of state parliamentary representation on federal electoral
performance.7 In particular, we focus on parties with vote shares in the neighborhood
7 There are two exceptions: Following a constitutional court ruling in 1955, the thresh-
old does not apply to the party of the Danish ethnic minority SSW, which is always
guaranteed representation in Schleswig-Holstein. After 1955 the SSW is therefore
excluded. Moreover, an exceptional rule has been applied in the state parliament
of Bremen, where a party that fails to pass the threshold state-wide, but passes the
5% threshold in the city of Bremerhaven, gets 1 representative. This was the case
for the DVU in the 1999 and the 2003 state elections and for the FDP in the 2003
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around the electoral threshold, comparing parties above this threshold (treated) with
parties below the threshold and hence without state representatives (controls).8
As in all regression discontinuity (RD) designs, our identification strategy is based
on the assumption that agents—in our case German political parties— cannot precisely
manipulate the assignment variable—their vote share in the state election—so that it
lie just below or above the cutoff value—the 5% threshold. Under this assumption,
potential outcomes (parties vote share with and without prior partliamentary pres-
ence) can be credibly assumed to be independent from treatment assignment (state
parlaimentary representation) (Lee and Lemieux 2009).9 For instance, the FDP in
1980 received 4.98 percent of the vote in the state election of Niedersachsen and was
thus absent from the state parliament. Imagine a counterfactual in which that party
had achieved only 0.02 percent more so as to enter state parliament. Would the party
have gained a higher share of the vote in that state in the following federal election of
1983? Fortunately even such close cases are not very rare in German state elections
(see Table A.10 in the Appendix for a list of parties’ state election results within the
narrow 0.7% window around the representation threshold).
Importantly, focusing on the discontinuities generated by the 5% threshold applied
in German state elections allows us to estimate the effect of state parliamentary repre-
state election. All analyses shown in the following sections include all observations,
irrespective of whether their parliamentary status complies with the five-percent rule
or not. Since we do not draw any distinction between crossing the threshold and
gaining a seat in the parliament, our estimation recovers the intent-to-treat effects
of state parliamentary representation.
8 Although the findings cannot be extrapolated to major parties or to very small par-
ties, this is not particularly problematic here since for these parties parliamentary
representation is almost invariably held constant. Major parties are always guar-
anteed entrance to the state parliament and very small parties are always left out.
Therefore, it cannot be parliamentary representation that accounts for spatial and
over-time variation in their electoral performance in federal elections.
9 This assumption does not mean that there no other determinants of parties’ state
vote share in the federal election. Rather, it means that the association of all these
factors with the outcome is smooth, so there is no other covariate that would cause
a discontinuous jump in the conditional distribution of the outcome at that same
point.
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sentation net of the effect of direct public subsidies. According to the party financing
regulations in Germany, parties receive public subsidies once they obtain 1% of the
state vote. The amount of these subsidies grows in a linear fashion, i.e. in proportion
to party’s vote share. Thus, as a result of the direct public party financing mechanism
there should be no gap between parliamentary insiders and outsiders.
We estimate the effects with local linear regression, which has been shown to have
attractive bias properties in estimating regression functions at the boundary (Fan and
Gijbels 1992) and enjoys rate optimality (Porter 2003). Following standard convention
(Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2009), instead of implementing two
seperate regressions below and above the threshold, we run a pooled regression on
both sides of the cut-off point:
Yi,s,t+1 = αl + τDi,s,t + βl(Xi,s,t − c) + (βr − βl)Di,s,t(Xi,s,t − c) + ǫi,s,t+1,
where Yi,s,t+1 represents party i’s vote share in the federal election t+1 at state s, Xis
denotes party i’s vote share in the state election s at t, c denotes the 5% threshold and
c − h ≤ X ≤ c + h. D is a dummy that switches on for the parties that acquire rep-
resentation in the state parliament. Using a triangular kernel, the estimation amounts
to a weighted linear regression within a bin h, with higher weights being applied onto
observations closer to the threshold. We allow the slope coefficients of each side to
differ, thus we denote them here by βl for the left side of the cuttof point and βr for the
right side respectively. αl denotes the regression intercept at the left side of the cutoff
point, whereas αr denotes the intercept at the right of the cutoff point, as evaluated
at X = c. Hence, τ = αr − αl, i.e. the difference between the two intercepts as (min-
imally) extrapolated at the point of the discontinuity. All our main analyses cluster
the errors at the state-election level. The results are also robust to various alternative
error structures, as discussed in the following sections.
The key question is the choice of the bandwidth, h. We start by using Imbens
and Kalyanaraman’s (2011) optimal bandwidth algorithm (IK), which performs well
in recovering experimental (Green et al. 2009), observational and simulation (Imbens
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and Kalyanaraman 2011) benchmarks. However, since this estimator is data driven,
it sometimes exceeds the four percent window below the threshold. This means that
parties below 1% might be included in some of the analyses. Given that public subsidies
start with 1% percent of the vote, there is a possibility for a within-group jump. We
address this problem in four ways. First, we examine the sensitivity of the estimates
across different bandwidths. Second, we follow Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik (2013)
in providing local randomization-inference based estimates, focusing only on the very
few observations exactly in the neighborhood of the 5% threshold and well above the
1% threshold. Details regarding the window selection process and the balance tests
accompanying our treatment effect estimates are provided in the Appendix.10 Third,
we explicitly test for within-group jumps. Fourth, we also present estimates using a
fixed 4% bandwidth (h = 4), which results in a comparison of insiders and outsiders,
all of whom receive state subsidies made available through the official state financing
system of political parties.11 We also conduct the standard diagnostic checks on the
validity of the RD design: a test for sorting in the forcing variable and several balance
tests, which we report in a separate section.
As a final point, we need to clarify how we try to disentangle our organization-driven
effects from the possibly confounding spill-over effects. We make use of a particular
feature of the German federal political system: the occurrence of state elections at
different times during the federal election cycle.12 The dates of the state elections
originally differed because the states that later joined the Federal Republic of Germany
10Focusing only on these observations makes it also easier to satisfy the exchangeability
criterion embedded in the understanding of the RD design as a local randomized
experiment (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2009).
11As a further robustness check, we replicate our main analyses excluding elections
between 1959 and 1969, since during this period—the first period in which state
subsidies were introduced—access to this source of financing was partially contingent
upon parliamentary representation (Duebber 1962, 80). The results, reported in the
Appendix (Figure A.2), are very similar to our main results discussed here.
12 It is relatively uncommon for German state prime ministers to call snap elections.
With a few exceptions, elections happen as scheduled at the natural end of each state
parliament.
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were constituted at different dates prior to the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949,
and were part of four different occupation zones. All states occupied by the United
States held early elections in 1946, while the majority of British and French occupied
states followed only in 1947. Moreover, snap federal elections were called in 1972, 1983
and 2005, which rearranged the order of state elections in the federal election cycle.
We assume that spillover effects are more likely to emerge when the period between
state and federal elections is small than when the two elections fall far apart. The
institutionalization effects hypothesized here need time to materialize, as parties need
to organize on the ground. Thus, using the distance between state election and the next
federal election, allows an informal assessment of the potential mechanisms driving the
effects of parliamentary representation.13
Results
Figure 1 presents three scatterplots. In each of them, the x-axis represents parties’ vote
share in the state election, centered at the 5% threshold. The y-axis presents the vote
share of the same parties in the subsequent federal election in the same state. Parties
not having crossed the electoral threshold in the state election appear with circles and
parties that have appear with triangles. The local linear regression curve denotes the
conditional expectation of parties’ vote share in the federal election in the state in
question, given their vote share in the prior state election.The vertical line represents
the cut-off point of parliamentary representation.
Figure 1a presents all observations within the chosen margin. As expected, a mono-
tone ascending pattern is observed, with high vote shares in the state election predicting
also higher vote shares in the coming federal election. The key question is whether there
is a jump in parties’ federal electoral performance as a result of crossing the threshold
of state parliamentary representation. No such jump is observed. Instead, parties’
federal vote shares appear to increase relatively smoothly as parties move from just
13We do not imply that these two mechanisms are exhaustive. We discuss various
alternative mechanisms and delve into the organization mechanism in more detail in
the sections following the presentation of the main results.
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(a) Full Sample
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(b) Below Median
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(c) Above Median
Figure 1: The effect of crossing the 5% threshold in a state election on a party’s
subsequent federal election vote share in the same state.
Note: Dots denote parties without state parliamentary representation and pluses denote parties with
parliamentary representation. The local regression (black solid) curves trace the mean vote share of
Yi,s,t+1 for parties below and above the threshold and the dotted curves denote the 95% pointwise
confidence intervals.
below to just above the threshold.
Figures 1b and 1c qualify this view, taking into consideration the time frame be-
tween the state and the federal election. We split groups with respect to the median
number of days intervening between the state and the federal election, i.e. 851 days.
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The first group (below the median) represents observations in which state and federal
elections took place in close proximity to each other (Figure 1b). The second (above
the median) represents the group of observations with considerable distance between
the two elections (Figure 1c). Finding a gap in the first case but not in the second
would provide evidence for the presence of spillover effects but no support to our orga-
nizational hypothesis. Reversely, finding a greater gap in the second than the first case
would lend support to the organizational hypothesis. This is what we find here: parties
that make it to the state parliament at election t enjoy higher vote shares in that state
in the next national election, t + 1. However, this effect is confined to those cases,
where a relatively long period has passed between the state and the federal election.
We now proceed to a more systematic examination of state parliamentaty effects.
Table 1 presents the results from the local linear regression estimation. The first column
of the Table uses all observations from our dataset. The last two columns classify
observations into the two groups: below and above the median distance between state
and federal elections. Thus, whereas the second column tests the spill-over hypothesis,
the third column tests our organizational hypothesis. The first part of the table uses
the IK bandwidth, whereas the second and the third parts of the table employ half
and twice that bandwidth respectively. The fourth section employs a common fixed
bandwidth (h = 4) to facilitate comparisons between the three columns. The fifth part
of the table presents treatment effect estimates using randomization inference, based
on observations directly surrounding the 5% threshold.14
All parts of the table point to the same conclusion. Looking at the impact of state
parliamentary representation when the upcoming federal election approaches, we find
14We follow the standard randomization inference procedure to calculate p-values, and
confidence intervals outlined at length in Ho and Imai (2006) and in Gerber and
Green (2012). The choice of the window in which our local “randomization-type
condition” holds is data-driven, based on sequential testing of nested windows of
different sizes starting from the smallest and ending at the largest in which the
sharp null hypothesis cannot be rejected for any window contained in it (Cattaneo,
Frandsen and Titiunik 2013). A detailed explanation of randomization inference, as
well as the specifications and results of the window selection procedure are shown in
the Appendix in Table A.1).
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Table 1: The impact of state-level representation on federal vote share in
the same state.
Full Sample Below Median Above Median
IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect 0.649 (0.635) 0.116 (0.769) 1.823 (0.803)∗∗
CIs [-0.596—1.894] [-1.391—1.623] [0.249—3.397]
Bandwidth (h) 4.61 4.74 5.48
n [treated] 213 102 117
n [control] 435 237 328
Half-IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect 0.143 (0.900) -0.450 (1.077) 1.977 (1.116)∗
CIs [-1.621—1.907] [-2.561—1.661] [-0.210—4.164]
Bandwidth (h) 2.31 2.37 2.74
n [treated] 131 64 81
n [control] 123 60 74
Double-IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect 0.861 (0.542) 0.323 (0.703) 1.833 (0.736)∗∗
CIs [-0.201—1.923] [-1.055—1.701] [0.390—3.276]
Bandwidth (h) 9.22 9.48 10.96
n [treated] 226 109 117
n [control] 684 346 328
Fixed Bandwidth (h = 4)
Treatment Effect 0.614 (0.688) 0.051 (0.837) 1.948 (0.974)∗∗
CIs [-0.737—1.963] [-1.589—1.691] [0.039—3.857]
Bandwidth (h) 4 4 4
n [treated] 194 94 100
n [control] 266 128 136
Randomization Inference
Treatment Effect 1.331∗ -0.523 2.755∗∗∗
CIs [-0.159—2.825] [-2.833—1.675] [1.105—4.385]
Window 0.7% 0.6% 1.1%
n [treated] 45 18 34
n [control] 35 13 24
Placebo Outcome, Vs,t−1: Above Median
IK bandwidth Half-IK Bandwidth Double-IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect 0.884 (0.997) 0.126 (1.330) 1.063 (0.869)
CIs [-1.069—2.837] [-2.480—2.731] [-0.641—2.766]
Bandwidth (h) 4.82 2.41 9.64
n [treated] 82 49 84
n [control] 197 49 259
Note: The entries denote the treatment effect (τ) of entering the state parliament on the party’s vote
share in the same state in the next federal election. ∗p<.10; ∗∗p<.05; ∗∗∗p<.01, two-tailed tests.
no gap between outsiders and insiders. On the contrary, looking at those cases in which
the federal election comes with considerable delay after the state election, we find a
18
jump in parties’ vote shares, which seems to be around 1.8 percentage points.15 The
randomization inference-based comparison of means across a very small window around
the threshold also generates a significant positive effect of parliamentary representation
but only for those observations with a considerable time lag between the two elections.
The last part of the Table presents a placebo test, using parties’ vote share in the
previous federal election as outcome. State parliamentary representation should not
affect parties’ vote share in the previous federal election. As expected, compared to
the main treatment effects, the gap is of lower magnitude, non-significant and more
sensitive to different bandwidths.16 Taken as a whole the findings suggest that there
is an upward gap associated with state parliamentary representation but only in those
cases where the federal election takes place after some period has passed since the last
state election. 17
How sensitive are our findings to the bandwidth choice? Figure 2 illustrates the
local average treatment effects across various bandwidths. The first panel includes all
observations, whereas the second and third panels use only observations below and
above the median distance respectively. The overall pattern reaffirms the results from
Table 1. Although more narrow bandwidths around the threshold naturally increase
the uncertainty surrounding the point estimates, there is a notable difference in the
15 In Table A.2 of the Appendix, we replicate the analysis using state, year and party-
fixed effects, as well as all their two-way combinations. The results remain robust to
the inclusion of all these types of fixed effects.
16 Since our main interest lies in the subset of observations with more days between state
and federal election (column 3), we focus only on those observations when implement-
ing the placebo test. The results are substantively identical when all observations
are included in the analysis.
17 In the Appendix (Table A.3), we extend this evidence by using the number of seats
instead of the percentage of votes as the outcome variable. In particular, we use
the number of seats (if any) gained by party i in state s at federal election t + 1
as a result of having crossed the threshold of 5% in the same state in the last state
election preceding the federal election. The results from this exercise are substantively
identical to those presented here: parties that cross the threshold in the state elections
translate their advantage in the next federal election not only into more votes in the
same state but also into more seats. This effect is moderated by the distance between
state and federal election (see Table A.3).
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magnitude of the effects between the second and third panel. This difference remains
robust and stable throughout the bandwidth range.18
As a next step, we engage in a more detailed exploration of the relationship between
state parliamentary representation and the timing of the federal election. We present
three sets of analysis. First, we try to assess the extent to which the difference between
the two groups (below and above median distance) is a result of sampling variability.
We address this question by applying a parametric model across the whole range of
observations.19 In particular, we employ the same equation as in the local linear model,
augmenting it by adding a binary term that denotes observations above the median.
This term is also interacted with all other terms of the model. To allow for non-
linearities in the relationship between state and federal vote share, we further add
up to three polynomials of the forcing variable. The results appear in Table 2. The
parametric models provide a very similar picture. They suggest that the difference
between the two sets of observations is substantive in terms of magnitude and, although
imprecisely estimated, it seems unlikely to be an artefact of sampling variability.
Second, we use a different rule to distinguish observations according to the distance
between state and federal election. In particular, instead of using the median distance,
we simply use the midpoint of the possible time range between the two elections. The
federal election can take place up to five years after the state election. We thus divide
the two groups according to whether the federal election took place within two and
a half years since the state election. We replicate the analysis using both the local
linear regression estimator and the global polynomial estimator. The results appear in
18 It also remains robust to different patterns of clustering, as shown in the Appendix
(Figure A.1), where different error structures are used. We also replicate this exer-
cise excluding the years 1959-1969, in which the threshold for participating in the
official public financing system for political parties coincided with the representation
threshold. The results, shown in the Appendix (Figure A.2), remain substantively
intact.
19Even here, however, we retain symmetry by considering only observations with up to
10 percentage points in the state election. This helps to avoid extrapolations beyond
the support of the data.
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Figure 2: Sensitivity of the Local Linear Regression Estimates to Varying Bandwidth.
Note: The solid black line in each graph denotes the local average treatment effect across different bandwidths, as denoted in the horizontal axis. The dashed
curves denote the 95% CIs and the vertical dashed line indicates the IK bandwidth. The first graph includes all observations. The second graph includes only
those observations in which the distance between state and federal election is below the median (851 days). The third graph looks at observations in which the
distance between state and federal election is above the median.
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Table 2: Parametric Analysis of the impact of State Parliamentary
Representation on Federal Vote Share.
One Two Three
Polynomial Polynomials Polynomials
Xi,s.t 1.332 (0.110)
∗∗ 2.140 (0.498)∗∗ 2.113 (1.441)
Di,s,t 0.112 (0.731) -0.933 (1.043) -1.214 (1.418)
Above Median -1.045 (0.666) -1.819 (1.142) -1.519 (1.620)
Xi,s.t ×Di,s,t -0.549 (0.303)
∗ -1.051 (0.946) -0.162 (2.535)
Xi,s.t× Above Median -0.254 (0.149)
∗ -1.011 (0.717) -0.471 (2.066)
Di,s,t× Above Median 1.727 (1.006)
∗ 2.715 (1.560)∗ 3.881 (2.062)∗
Xi,s.t ×Di,s,t× Above Median -0.045 (0.389) 0.404 (1.352) -4.359 (3.723)
X2i,s.t 0.138 (0.074)
∗ 0.126 (0.539)
X2i,s.t ×Di,s,t -0.203 (0.196) -0.658 (1.308)
X2i,s.t× Above Median -0.129 (0.106) 0.097 (0.752)
X2i,s.t ×Di,s,t× Above Median 0.195 (0.278) 2.232 (1.798)
X3i,s.t -0.001 (0.059)
X3i,s.t ×Di,s,t 0.066 (0.180)
X3i,s.t× Above Median 0.026 (0.081)
X3i,s.t ×Di,s,t× Above Median -0.336 (0.251)
Intercept 6.450 (0.491)∗∗ 7.331 (0.803)∗∗ 7.318 (1.082)∗∗
n (clusters) 901 (191) 901 (191) 901 (191)
Average Treatment Effects
τ : Below Median
0.112 (0.731) -0.933 (1.043) -1.214 (1.418)
(Di,s,t)
τ : Above Median
1.838 (0.718)∗ 1.783 (1.160) 2.667 (1.478)∗
(Di,s,t +Di,s,t× Above Median)
Note: The entries denote OLS estimates, with Xi,s,t being the forcing variable (state vote share of
party i, in state s and election t) and Di,s,t a binary indicator switching on for observations above
the threshold. Errors are clustered at the state-election level. Analytical standard errors are shown
in the last two rows of the table. ∗p<.10; ∗∗p<.05, two-tailed tests.
the Appendix (Table A.4 and Figure A.3) and they point to the same direction as the
analysis using the median distance between state and federal election.
Third, we try being more agnostic about the exact functional form in the relation-
ship between state parliamentary representation and distance between the two types
of elections. Instead of imposing any structure into the data, we try to infer this re-
lationship in a indirect fashion. We estimate the effect of crossing the state threshold
on the federal vote share for each additional day passing since the state election. The
results are shown in Figure 3. The x-axis depicts the minimum number of days be-
tween state and federal election. For instance, zero means that the federal election
might have taken place at any point in time starting from the same date as the state
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election; fifty means that the federal election has taken place at least 50 days after
the state election; and so on up until 1460 days (end of fourth year) since the state
election.20 Each dot presents the local average effect of parliamentary representation,
given the number of days that sets the minimum barrier of distance between the two
elections. The higher the number the more days have passed since the previous state
election, hence the smaller the pool of observations. In other words, each analysis is
nested within the previous one. The black solid curve traces the local mean response
in the resulting scatterplot. In so doing, it provides a summary of the magnitude of
the treatment effects according the number of days that have passed since the state
election. The overall pattern is clearly ascending and for most part monotone, denoting
that the effect of parliamentary representation increases as the distance between the
two elections also increases.
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Figure 3: A closer look at the distance between state and federal election
and the impact of state representation on federal vote share.
Note: Each dot represents a local average treatment effect, given that the federal election took place
at least as many days as denoted in the x-axis since the state election. The local regression curve
summarizes the overall pattern.
20All observations with state-federal election distance of more than four years are in-
cluded within the same analysis.
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Robustness Checks and Diagnostics
We conduct three tests to examine the sensitivity of the results. First, we need to check
for sorting in the running variable. Identification in the regression discontinuity design
is based on the assumption that agents have imprecise control over the assignment
variable around the threshold value. This means that we assume that parties cannot
fully manipulate their vote share so as to be just below or (more likely) above the
threshold. Although in free and fair elections it is hard to see how this assumption can
be violated, previous studies on incumbency advantage have suggested possible sorting
mechanisms (Caughy and Sekhon 2011; Eggers et al. 2015).21 We test for sorting in the
forcing variable using the McCrary (2008) density test. The test refutes this possibility.
The p-value for the null of no-sorting is 0.23.22 Figure A.2 in the Appendix illustrates
the absence of sorting and further discusses why sorting cannot be driving our results.23
Second, we check for covariate balance at the cutoff point. It might be that some
parties, years or states are over- or under-represented on each side of the cut-off point,
confounding our estimates. To see whether this is the case, we examine whether a
significant gap at the cutoff point is observed in various seemingly irrelevant outcomes.
As outcome variables we use a set of dummy variables —for each of the 16 states,
Eastern region, FDP party, Green party, and extreme right party— as well as year, both
as a linear and quadratic trend and as a pre/post-1989 binary outcome. The results are
21That said, it is clear that our design is not based on the marginality of the election.
Any type of election could provide us with parties near the 5 percent threshold.
Therefore, the criticisms related to studies using the margin of victory as the forcing
variable do not apply in our design.
22The test has been implemented only for the group of observations above the median
distance, since it is the results from this analysis we need to scrutinize.
23One reason that might have provided strong incentives for manipulation is the simul-
taneous access to public subventions. This was the case only between 1959 and 1969.
Indeed, when excluding these observations, the p-value of no sorting becomes 0.49
(Figure A.4). As shown in the Appendix (Figure A.2), the results remain robust to
the exclusion of these observations. More details about the sorting analyses can be
found in the Appendix.
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shown in Table 3. In total we implement 21 balance tests and only two of them prove
marginally significant at the p<.1 level (Sachsen and Saarland).24 Importantly, neither
the FDP, nor the Green party dummies are statistically significant. This result helps us
discount the possibility that the two larger parties, CDU and SPD, strategically “lend”
votes to potential coalition partners in order to aid them in crossing the 5%-threshold.
While this type of strategic voting might occur occasionally, there is no evidence that
the FDP in particular sorts on the right side of the representation threshold. We return
to this issue in a following section.
Third, we check whether there are within-group jumps. If the reason for the ob-
served gap between insiders and outsiders is parliamentary representation, we should
not find significant discontinuities in the conditional expecetation of the outcome vari-
able among observations that do not differ in terms of their treatment value. To detect
such discontinuities, we focus separately on parties below and on parties above the
5% electoral threshold. We then split each group into two subgroups, treating parties
with higher vote shares as treated and parties with lower vote shares as controls. To
maximize statistical power, the benchmark for this within-group division is the median
(we also use the within-group mean, as shown in Table A.6). The results from this
analysis appear in the Appendix (Table A.6). We find no instance of within-group
jumps. When treatment status does not change, no upward gap is found as a result of
a difference in parties’ vote shares.
Unpacking the Organizational Mechanism
The results presented thus far indicate that representation in the state parliament of-
fers a comparative advantage in the subsequent federal election. The fact that this
effect needs time to materialize points to its organizational nature, but does direct
evidence support that inference? In addressing that question we first consider the fi-
nancial resources available to parliamentary parties in each state. Some German states
24 In the Appendix (Figure A.5) we present the main results without these two states.
The findings remain practically identical. For reasons of completeness, Table A.5
presents the balance tests for the full sample of observations.
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Table 3: Balance Checks
RD 95% Lower 95% Upper IK
Estimates Bound Bound Bandwidth
Extreme right -0.071 (0.124) -0.314 0.172 2.16
East Germany -0.075 (0.134) -0.336 0.187 2.36
Year 0.606 (2.913) -5.103 6.315 6.48
Year2 4415 (10796) -16745 25575 10.36
Post-1989 0.047 (0.138) -0.223 0.317 2.49
FDP -0.106 (0.180) -0.457 0.248 1.61
Greens 0.182 (0.148) -0.108 0.472 1.83
Baden-
0.015 (0.056) -0.095 0.125 2.22
Wuttemberg
Bayern -0.092 (0.072) -0.233 0.049 1.96
Berlin -0.022 (0.081) -0.179 0.135 2.04
Brandenburg 0.035 (0.030) -0.024 0.094 1.65
Bremen 0.024 (0.053) -0.080 0.128 1.82
Hamburg -0.110 (0.125) -0.353 0.133 1.87
Hessen -0.000 (0.078) -0.153 0.153 1.92
Mecklenburg-
-0.031 (0.059) -0.243 0.109 1.96
Vorpommern
Niedersachsen -0.067 (0.090) -0.109 0.243 2.09
Nordrhein-
0.076 (0.084) -0.089 0.241 2.29
Westfalen
Rheinland-
-0.014 (0.082) -0.175 0.147 1.97
Pfalz
Saarland 0.135 (0.082)∗ -0.026 0.296 2.02
Sachsen 0.093 (0.065) -0.034 0.220 1.82
Sachsen-
-0.054 (0.112) -0.273 0.165 1.94
Anhalt
Schleswig-
0.080 (0.084) -0.086 0.247 2.12
Holstein
Thueringen -0.082 (0.050)∗ -0.181 0.015 1.87
Note: The entries in the first column denote the treatment effect (τ) of entering the state
parliament on various placebo outcomes. Standard errors, clustered at the state-election level,
in parentheses. ∗p<.10; ∗∗p<.05, two-tailed tests.
have been more generous when it comes to the appropriation of public money to par-
liamentary parties than other states. Does subnational parliamentary representation
lead to higher national vote shares in states with higher per capita parliamentary party
funding?
The absolute amount of state funding made available to parties present in state
parliament can be found in the yearly state budgets. We divide the absolute amount
of state funding by the number of parties present in the legislature and by the number
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of inhabitants in each state to get an idea about how many additional Euro a parlia-
mentary party has at its disposal to spend on organization, service delivery, and on
promoting its political goals.25 The amount of state funding a parliamentary party
receives per inhabitant ranges from 10 cents in Baden-Wuerttemberg to 1.7 Euros in
Bremen.
We divide our sample into two groups based on whether states fall above or below
the median in parliamentary party funding per inhabitant and repeat the analysis on
these two subsamples. This step will show whether the consequences of state-level
parliamentary election vary depending upon the general level of a state’s financial
support for political parties. The results displayed in Table 4 strongly support the
organizational mechanism, showing that insiders benefit more in electoral terms in
those states where parliamentary funding as a rule is more generous.
Table 4: The Role of Parliamentary Benefits
States with low levels States with high levels
of parliamentary party funding of parliamentary party funding
IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect 0.775 (1.153) 4.176 (1.510)∗∗
95% CIs [-1.484—3.035] [1.216—7.136]
Bandwidth 4.84 4.04
n [treated] 80 28
n [control] 154 62
Fixed Bandwidth (h = 4)
Treatment Effect 0.645 (1.296) 4.208 (1.515)∗∗
95% CIs [-1.895—3.185] [1.175—5.502]
n [treated] 72 28
n [control] 77 59
Note: The analysis distinguishes between the eight states with lower (left column) and the eight states
with higher (right column) parliamentary funding. We focus only on those cases where the distance
between the state and the federal election is at least 851 days, because it is for these cases that we
find an effect of parliamentary representation. Using half or double of the IK bandwidth produces
substantively identical results. ∗p<.10; ∗∗p<.05, two tailed tests.
25We use data from the 2010 fiscal year because this is the earliest year all German
states have made their budgets available online. Where data is available from earlier
years, we check if the observed rankings of states hold, and it looks like there is a
more general pattern of some states providing more generous parliamentary party
funding than others. The 2010 data used to rank states according to generosity of
parliamentary party funding can be found in Table A.7 in the Appendix.
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Second, we explore the effects of state parliamentary representation on future state
party membership. If the organizational mechanism holds, parties that enter state
parliament should attract more state party activists than parties that fail to pass the
5%-threshold. A growth in the membership base after entering state parliament would
thus be evidence for the existence of increasing organizational capabilities in the state.
In order to test if a party attracts more members in those states, where it enters state
parliament, we collect yearly data on FDP, Green Party and Left Party membership
in the period between 1990 and 2013.26 Those 23 years were a turbulent period for
both parties, in which they lost and gained representation in several state parliaments.
Often only a few 1000 votes decided the parties’ fates in a state election.
We analyze these data employing again the discontinuities stemming from the 5%
threshold. We thus compare the membership rates of the FDP, the Greens and the
Left Party (“die Linke”) in cases where they (marginally) enter the state parliament
to cases in which they are (marginally) left out. Since our membership data vary
by year, we can examine the impact of entering the state parliament at year t on
parties’ membership rates at every year until the next state election. Our outcome of
interest thus becomes state party membership (the number of members per 1 million
inhabitants) in years t+ 1, t+ 2, t+ 3 and t+ 4. We use the IK bandwidth, half and
twice this bandwidth, a common fixed bandwidth of h = 4, and local randomization
inference to overcome potential small-sample problems arising from the fact that there
are only few observations exactly below and above the cutoff point for the shorter
period between 1990 and 2013.27
The results, reported in Table 5, illustrate the way parliamentary representation
yields significant organizational benefits. In cases where the two parties marginally
cross the threshold, they have on average around 600 more members per million in-
26Our use of the specific parties and time period is only due to data availability reasons.
These were the only reliable data we could find on party membership in Germany.
27We again engage in sequential testing of windows from the smallest to the largest to
find that the largest window within which the local randomization assumption holds
is within 1.6 percentage points on either side of the representation threshold.
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habitants than in cases in which they marginally fail to cross the threshold. Despite
the uncertainty surrounding this estimate, the effect of parliamentary representation
on future state party membership is robust to different bandwidths. Using the ±1.6%
window around the cutoff point, in which the local randomization assumption seems
to hold, randomization-based inference provides a very similar picture. In the last
section of the Table, we further explore the difference in membership rates before and
after a state election, conditional on parliamentary status. Parties that make it into
the state parliament gain approximately 130 more members two years after entering
parliament, compared to when they fail to cross the 5% threshold. In line with our
hypothesized mechanism, this number increases over time to 162 additional members
in the 4th year. In absolute terms, this means that if the FDP enters the state par-
liament of Northrhine-Westphalia (the largest state in Germany of around 18 million
inhabitants), it gains around 2,900 members in the course of the parliament compared
to the year before the election. This amounts to around 17% of its average overall
membership in this state.
The sixth part of Table 5 tests whether the effect attributed to state parliamentary
presence is due to state-specific unobserved heterogeneity. If we simply capitalize on
differential membership rates of both parties across states, we should observe the same
gap in the years preceding the state election. We test this possibility and find no
significant difference in the membership rates of parties at time t − 1, t − 2, t − 3,
and t− 4 according to whether they entered parliament in election t. Apart from not
attaining statistical significance at any conventional level, the estimates are of much
lower magnitude, and are also changing sign at t− 4.
When combined, these sets of findings suggest that the membership effects identified
here are due to parties’ entrance into the state parliament. Gaining more members,
parties have more resources to organize on the ground. More members means more
people to distribute leaflets, put up signs and talk to their friends come Election Day.
It seems highly plausible that these figures have an impact on the electoral fortunes of
the party in national elections.
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Table 5: The impact of state-level representation on party membership,
FDP, Greens, and Left Party 1990-2013
Memberst+1 Memberst+2 Memberst+3 Memberst+4
IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect
720.0∗∗ 651.8∗∗ 569.6∗ 575.5∗
(361.5) (329.6) (305.6) (306.1)
Bandwidth (h) 3.449 3.567 4.254 4.266
n [treated] 62 60 61 60
n [control] 48 48 49 49
Half IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect
641.3 577.4 553.3 537.9
(419.4) (382.3) ( 362.0) (357.9)
Bandwidth (h) 1.725 1.784 2.127 2.133
n [treated] 36 35 40 39
n [control] 23 23 26 26
Double IK Bandwidth
Treatment Effect
651.9∗∗ 636.7∗∗ 609.4∗∗ 604.2∗∗
(303.4) (269.8) (246.0) (245.6)
Bandwidth (h) 6.898 7.134 8.508 8.531
n [treated] 84 83 84 83
n [control] 50 50 49 49
Fixed Bandwidth (h = 4)
Treatment Effect
709.5∗∗ 642.9∗∗ 583.4∗ 590.7∗
(350.6) (321.2) (312.2) (312.8)
n [treated] 66 64 60 59
n [control] 50 50 49 49
Randomization Inference (Window = 1.6%)
Treatment Effect
490.6∗ 467.6∗ 433.1∗ 448.9∗
[-62.9—1012.9] [-31.0—921.9] [-45.6—847.6] [-39.5—857.7]
n [treated] 33 32 32 31
n [control] 22 22 21 21
Placebo Tests: Memberst−1 Memberst−2 Memberst−3 Memberst−4
Fixed Bandwidth (h = 4)
Treatment Effect
275.0 161.1 51.9 -157.0
(344.9) (383.6) (457.7) (566.6)
n [treated] 55 49 46 46
n [control] 47 46 46 45
Change in Members from t− 1 to:
(h = 4) t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Treatment Effect
81.7 130.1∗ 150.6∗ 161.9
(54.05) (70.19) (90.91) (109.4)
n [treated] 54 52 48 47
n [control] 47 47 46 46
Randomization Inference : Change in Members from t− 1 to:
(Window = 1.6%) t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
Treatment Effect
118.6∗∗ 165.5∗∗∗ 188** 207.2∗∗
CIs [20.2—217.9] [35.1—300.6] [26.9—352] [9.5—402.9]
n [treated] 23 22 22 21
n [control] 21 21 20 20
The entries denote differences in members per 100,000 inhabitants according to whether
the party achieved state parliamentary representation. ∗p<.10; ∗∗ p<.05; ∗∗∗ p<.0.01,
two tailed tests. State party membership data source: Niedermayer, Oskar (2015).
Parteimitglieder in Deutschland: Version 2015. Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-
Zentrum, Nr. 25.
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Alternative Mechanisms
After presenting two types of direct evidence in support of the organizational mecha-
nism, effects on party membership and effects conditional on financial resources pro-
vided to parliamentary parties, we now turn to alternative mechanisms. The three
most plausible alternative mechanisms that could explain our results are media at-
tention; learning effects related to political experience; and participation in coalition
governments. We examine all three mechanisms.
First, we collected media data at the state level for the period between 2000 and
2015, the period for which data was available from online media archives. Our de-
pendent variable is the absolute number of regional newspaper articles that men-
tion the party following a state election in which the party either marginally en-
tered state parliament or marginally failed to do so. The data was collected by quar-
ter using the media search engines Nexis (www.nexis.com), supplemented by Genios
(www.genios.de/dosearch) when Nexis data was unavailable for a specific state, for
the following parties: FDP, the Greens, NPD, Alternative für Deutschland, and Die
Linke. Where there was more than one newspaper per state, for consistency reasons,
we always chose the regional newspaper with the longest over-time availability. The
results appear in Figure 4.
If media attention could mediate our results, then first, we would expect newspaper
articles about parties that enter parliament to be significantly more frequent than
articles about parties that fail to enter parliament. Second, we would expect this
media effect to increase over time. In fact, we find the exact opposite to be the case.
Parties that just marginally entered parliament do not receive significantly more media
attention than parties that just marginally failed to do so. Moreover, there is more
attention to insiders just after the state election and this attention decreases during
the election cycle, in a monotone fashion, relative to the media attention received by
parties that just marginally failed to enter parliament.28 While we do not have any
28The figure uses the IK bandwidth. In the Appendix (Figure A.6) we provide the re-
sults from the same analysis, using half- and double-IK bandwidths. In both graphs,
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information about whether the tone of the newspaper articles was positive or negative,
assuming that parties that enter parliament receive an extra amount of scrutiny, these
results might help to explain why we fail to find smaller, but positive effects at the
beginning of the circle. Media scrutiny might mitigate the effects of the organizational
resources that become available right after an election victory.
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Figure 4: The Impact of State Parliamentary Representation Media
Coverage throughout the State Election Cycle.
Note: Each spike denotes the average treatment effect of entering state parliament on media mentions
on the party, evaluated at the cutoff point, i.e. the 5% threshold. The empty squares represent
estimates stemming from local linear regression, using the IK bandwidth. Each spike presents a
quarter of the year. Vertical axes denote the 95% confidence intervals.
Moreover, we test if learning from political experience could explain that parties
benefit when more time passes between the state and the federal election. One could
imagine that parties gain valuable parliamentary experience and that they can use this
experience to gain votes. Following this logic, learning effects should be steeper for
parties that have not previously been in parliament than for parties that already have
prior parliamentary experience. We try to test this expectation by comparing parties
that were present in the previous state parliament versus those that were absent. Full
the overall patterns point to the same conclusion as the pattern shown in Figure 4.
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details about the model specifications and the full results are shown in the Appendix
(see Table A.8). Table 6 displays the key findings, all of which stem from a global
polynomial model in which experience (a dummy switching on for parties being in the
previous state legislature) is interacted with all other predictors of federal vote share.
Up to three polynomials have been used.
The table is divided into two parts, according to the distance between state and
federal election (below or above the median). In each part of the table, the entries of
the first two rows denote the local average treatment of state parliamentary presence,
evaluated at the cutoff point that corresponds to the electoral threshold, both for
parties with and without experience. The third row of each part of the table denotes
the difference between the first two rows and thus provides the moderating effect of
experience. We do not find consistent evidence in favour of the experience hypothesis.
As shown in the third row of both parts of the table, the moderating effect of experience
changes sign across the different specifications and is constantly below standard levels
of statistical significance. It seems that the only effect that can be detected is in
making parliamentary representation from having a negative effect into making no
difference for future federal vote share only in cases with small distance between state
and federal elections. No effect is found whatsoever for the observations with above-
median distance between state and federal elections. Parties that were not present in
parliament at time t-1 and enter parliament at time t do not seem to be more likely to
do well in federal elections than parties that already gained political experience in the
previous parliament.
Finally, coalition dynamics in Germany open one further possibility that needs
addressing: Although participation in coalition government is necessarily a consequence
of parliamentary representation, we concede that our theorized mechanism does not
necessarily rest on participation in state government. To be sure, parties in state
government should be given even more privileged access than opposition parties to
the organizational benefits alluded to above. However, we believe that being part of
the state executive is not a necessary condition for having access into organizational
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Table 6: State Parliamentary Representation, Experience and National
Electoral Performance.
One Two Three
Polynomial Polynomials Polynomials
(1) No Experience × Below 0.226 (1.078) -2.345 (1.364)∗ -2.920 (1.631)∗∗
(2) Experience × Below 0.149 (1.003) -0.406 (1.538) -0.088 (2.108)
(2) - (1) -0.077 (1.561) 1.939 (2.090) 2.832 (2.600)
(3) No Experience × Above 1.887 (1.194) 2.573 (1.342)∗∗ 1.957 (1.489)
(4) Experience × Above 1.793 (0.884)∗∗ 1.798 (1.434) 3.148 (1.914)∗
(4)-(3) -0.940 (1.487) -0.955 (1.912) 1.911 (2.418)
Note: In each part of the table, the entries of the first two rows denote the local average treatment
of state parliamentary presence, conditional on presence or absence of experience. The third row
denotes the moderating effect of experience. All estimates stem from OLS models. The standard
errors accompanying all point estimates are clustered at the state-election level. Each entry presents
a linear combination of coefficients, with analytical standard errors in parentheses. Full details about
these models are provided in the Appendix (Table A.8). ∗p<.10; ∗∗p<.05, two-tailed tests.
resources. Consequently, we expect that our results are not driven only by parties that
by entering into the legislature become also coalition partners. To test whether this is
the case we replicate the analysis in Table 1 excluding the liberal party FDP from the
analysis. The FDP has been the main party of government entering frequent coalitions
with both CDU and SPD at state and federal level. If results were merely driven
by participation in governments, excluding all FDP cases should lower the estimated
effect of parliamentary representation. However, as Figure A.7 in the Appendix shows,
estimates are very similar when excluding the German liberal party.
Without ruling out all possible alternative mechanisms, these results lend further
support to the organizational mechanism underlying the over time effects that we
observe in this study.
Discussion
Subnational parliamentary representation can provide a political advantage for parties
that contest nationwide elections if the national election does not follow immediately
after the successful subnational election. Our results indicate that after 3 or 4 years
of crossing the representation threshold in German state parliaments, the electoral
advantage in federal elections amounts to around 1.8 percentage points.
What explains this effect? Evidently, it is quite difficult to reconcile this lagged
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effect of state parliamentary representation with the idea of bandwagon effects or pos-
itive media coverage in the immediate aftermath of a successful election. In contrast,
the organizational mechanism seems more likely to fit these results. Parties that are
present in state parliaments can offer the material and status benefits of a political
career, hire full time staff and use generous funds to build their party organization.
The party is therefore better able to attract activists and appeal to the electorate.
Activists who set their eyes on a political career find opportunities to get ahead and
can in turn be employed by the party for mobilization and persuasion efforts. Voters
can address their concerns to state representatives, whose offices provide a range of
services to them. However, addressing grievances within the electorate takes time, as
does the use of parliamentary funds to build an effective organization. This finding has
four important implications that merit some elaboration.
The first implication alludes to the role of subnational institutions as moderators
of top-down effects. The more institutionalized a party, the less disruptive the impact
of environmental uncertainty (Panebianco 1988, 109). If national trends work against
a party, electoral losses will be moderated in those states in which the party has been
present in state legislatures. The same holds for gains parties make thanks to national
factors. Future research could possibly explore such instances to test some observa-
tional implications of the organizational theory. One such implication would be the
gradual geographical sorting of small parties’ electoral visibility.
Second, the results presented here directly challenge the consensus, according to
which politics in decentralized political systems can be described as a one-way street
from the higher to the lower level. Such a characterization is overly simplistic. As sub-
national entities gain more powers, and subnational parliamentary parties gain more
resources, political parties gain an electoral advantage from having access to these re-
sources. Since it is easier for smaller political parties to access indirect funding provided
to parliamentary parties at the subnational than at the national level, future research
can assess whether the multi-level structure of the state might contribute to explaining
the varying success of smaller and new parties across established democracies. Al-
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though most of the literature on the emergence of new parties has so far concentrated
on the proportionality of the electoral system, the degree of decentralization might be
another factor that might warrant consideration from researchers.29
Third, this paper offers strong support for a crucial assumption of cartelization
theory, namely that political parties benefit from being inside the political system, and
inside subnational assemblies. However, the mechanism driving this advantage is not
necessarily dependent on the systems of direct public party financing. Parties benefit
because the state pays for their parliamentary work, because they use state resources
to organize, and because access to the state provides parties with high-status and
materially lucrative positions to distribute amongst its leadership. In light of these
results and previous work, it seems that the mechanism of how established parties
benefit in Western democracies is more complex than the debate about official public
party financing suggests.
Fourth, the paper calls for a qualification of the dominant view that subnational
elections are simply imperfect reflections of party competition at the national level.
Previous studies have alluded to such a top-down process either when examining elec-
tions at lower (Schakel and Jeffery 2012) or higher (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996)
level than the national level. The resulting theory of second-order elections stated that
voters often transfer their national voting decision rules into subnational elections. This
study reveals that even if this is the case, the final outcome of subnational elections
may have indirect effects. By getting access to state funds, parliamentary parties have
the opportunity to become more visible and useful to their electorate at different levels
of government. Previous evidence also from Germany suggests that voters’ gratitude
to local services (Bechtel and Hainmueller 2011) lasts for at least one election term.
Thus, when there is time for this organizational advantage to materialize, parties that
29Given that the Federal Republic of Germany has been a decentralized state right
from its founding after WW2, we should not observe significant time trends in this
case. While most of the observations in our data set come from more recent decades,
preliminary analyses conducted here and shown in detail in the Appendix (Table
A.9 and Figure A.8) suggest that there are no robust, significant time trends in our
treatment effects, which speaks to their generalizability across different time periods.
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have gained access to the decentralized state eventually transfer this benefit from the
subnational to the national domain.
Although our empirical results are based on data from German state and federal
elections, our theoretical predictions should also apply to other decentralized political
systems. The conditions are the existence of an integrated party system across multiple
levels of government, and subnational representative bodies that provide access to sub-
stantial state resources. Therefore, as subnational entities continue to gain more com-
petencies over the center, one can deduce that apart from the well-documented process
of the nationalization of subnational politics, a parallel process of decentralization of
national politics is also taking place. As decentralization advances in most established
democracies, the political machinery created through representation in subnational
institutions gradually transforms national politics by bringing subnational dynamics
back into the national political arena.
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